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Preemption in the Fisheries and the
United Nations' Law of the Sea Treaty
Leslie M. MacRae*
I. Introduction
For centuries the nations of the world have sought to agree on
the proper allocation of control over the oceans.1 In 1973, the Third
* Assistant Professor of Law, The Dickinson School of Law. B.A. 1971, University of
Virginia; J.D. 1973, Baylor University School of Law; LL.M. 1983, Temple University School
of Law.
I. The dispute over the proper allocation and control over the oceans goes back to
early Greek and Roman times. Greece it appears believed that the ocean was subject to being
appropriated by the coastal states, C. PHILLIPSON, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW AND CUSTOM OF
ANCIENT GREECE 367 (1911). Roman law suggests that the sea is open to all and therefore not
subject to appropriation, although some scholars are skeptical of such an interpretation. See
S.P. SCHOTT. THE CIVIL LAW 243 (1973) and P. POTTER, THE FREEDOM OF THE SEA IN His-
TORY, LAW AND POLITICS 27 (1924).
The dispute over the free sea versus domain of the sea concepts erupted when Hugo Gro-
tius in his book, Mare Liberum, presented a carefully thought out and well documented dis-
cussion of the freedom of the seas. GROTIUS, MARE LIBERUM (trans. 1916). So great was the
impact of this book, that the King of England, James, who desired to appropriate several
fisheries, attacked Grotius and his thesis. T.W. FULTON, THE SOVEREIGNTY OF THE SEA 351
(1911).
John Seldon, an English lawyer, responded to Grotius in a book defending appropriation.
See J. SELDON. OF THE DOMINION. OR, OWNERSHIP OF THE SEA (trans. 1972). This book also
became a classic of international law. Such was the effect of these authors, that the actual
legal regime of the oceans was unsettled for centuries. Vattel, in his great work, The Law of
Nations, suggested a compromise:
It is manifest that the use of the open sea, which consists in navigation and
fishing, is innocent and inexhaustible; that is to say - he who navigates or fishes
in the open sea does no injury to anyone, and the sea, in two respects, is suffi-
cient for all mankind. Now, nature does not give to man a right of appropriating
to himself things that may be innocently used, and that are inexhaustible, and
sufficient for all. For, since these things, while common to all, are sufficient to
supply the wants of each, - whoever should, to the exclusion of all other partici-
pants, attempt to render himself sole proprietor of them, would unreasonably
wrest the bounteous gifts of nature from the parties excluded.
VATTEL. LAW OF NATIONS 125 (trans. 1863). Recognizing that certain commodities were be-
coming limited due to increasing populations, thus forcing nations to appropriate land to feed
their people, Vattel argued that these constraints did not apply to the ocean.
But this reason [need to appropriate land for food] cannot apply to things
[which are in themselves inexhaustible] and consequently, it cannot furnish any
just grounds for seizing the exclusive possession of them. If the free and common
use of a thing of this nature was prejudicial or dangerous to a nation, the care of
their own safety would authorize them to reduce that thing under their own
dominion . . . . But this is not the case with the open sea, on which people may
sail and fish without the least prejudice to any person whatsoever, and without
putting any one in danger. No nation, therefore, has a right to take possession of
the open sea, or claim the sole use of it, to the exclusion of other nations.
Id. at 125.
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United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) con-
vened in a concerted effort to negotiate a comprehensive treaty regu-
lating the uses of the oceans. 2 This third attempt at adoption of such
a document was remarkably successful, resulting in a completed text
whose provisions contain more than 300 articles designed to regulate
use of the oceans.3
During the negotiation of the Law of the Sea Treaty, the
United States enacted the Fishery Conservation and Management
Act (FCMA).4 The FCMA was designed to complement the Law of
the Sea Treaty's provisions regulating fishing. 5 Congress and Presi-
The arguments Vattel used, pro and con to support appropriation, became the focal point
for countries exposing the appropriation as freedom of the sea theory. His appropriation justifi-
cation is very similar to the arguments made by countries such as the United States to justify
unilateral extension of control over ocean spaces. When President Truman extended United
States jurisdiction over the seabed of the continental shelf, his arguments had a familiar ring:
Whereas the Government of the United States of America, aware of the long
range world-wide need for new sources of petroleum and other minerals, holds
the view that efforts to discover and make available new supplies of these re-
sources should be encouraged . . . Whereas recognized jurisdiction over these
resources is required in the interest of their conservation and prudent utilization
when and as development is undertaken; . . . .NOW THEREFORE I,
HARRY S TRUMAN, President of the United States of America, do hereby
proclaim the following policy of the United States of America with respect to
the natural resources of the subsoil and seabed of the continental shelf. Having
concern for the urgency of conserving and prudently utilizing its natural re-
sources, the Government of the United States regards the natural resources of
the subsoil and seabed of the continental shelf beneath the high seas but contigu-
ous to the coasts of the United States subject to its jurisdiction and control.
Pres. Res. of Sept. 28, 1945, No. 2667, 59 Stat. 884 (1945).
2. Attempts to negotiate a comprehensive treaty went back to 1958 when the first
Law of the Sea Conference took place. The first conference resulted in four conventions codify-
ing parts of the law of the sea. See Convention on the High Seas, Sept. 30, 1962, 13 U.S.T.
2312, T.I.A.S. No. 5200, 450 U.N.T.S. 82; Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contig-
uous Zone, Sept. 10, 1964, 15 U.S.T. 1606, T.I.A.S. No. 5639, 516 U.N.T.S. 205, Convention
on the Continental Shelf, June 10, 1964, 15 U.S.T. 471, T.I.A.S. No. 5578, 499 U.N.T.S. 311,
Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas, March 20,
1966, 17 U.S.T. 138, T.I.A.S. No. 5969, 559 U.N.T.S. 285.
The Second Conference on the Law of the Sea convened in 1960 but failed to accomplish
its primary goal of setting an internationally acceptable maximum width for the territorial sea.
The third and presumably last conference convened in 1973 and resulted in an agreement, the
official text of which is to be found in a comprehensive U.N. Document A/Conf. 62/122 (Oct.
7, 1982). The text used in the preparation of this article is from 21 International Legal Mater-
ials 1261 (1982) [hereinafter cited as UNCLOS Treaty]. Page references are to the I.L.M.
text.
3. U.N. Document A/Conf. 62/122 (Oct. 7, 1982). The Treaty is remarkable for its
comprehensiveness as well as its length. Almost all ocean space use is regulated with the only
major exception being Antarctica.
4. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1882 (1982).
5. 16 U.S.C. § 1881 Effect on Law of the Sea Treaty.
If the United States ratifies a comprehensive treaty, which includes provisions
with respect to fishery conservation and management jurisdiction, resulting from
any United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, the Secretary, after
consultation with the Secretary of State, may promulgate any amendment to the
regulations promulgated under this Act if such amendment is necessary and ap-
propriate to conform such regulations to the provisions of such treaty, in antici-
pation of the date when such treaty shall come into force and effect for, or other-
wise be applicable to, the United States.
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dent Ford believed that the passage of the Act was necessary to pre-
vent further overfishing off United States shores pending passage of
the UNCLOS Treaty.6 The FCMA and its provisions anticipate ulti-
mate United States acceptance of the UNCLOS Treaty.7
For reasons unassociated with the fisheries issue, President Rea-
gan has refused to permit the United States to sign the Treaty.8
6. STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON COMMERCE, 94TH CONG., 2D SESS, A LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF THE FISHERY CONSERVATION AND MANAGEMENT ACT OF 1976, 2, 34-35 (Comm.
Print 1976) [hereinafter cited as A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY]. Congress, in the Purpose Section,
16 U.S.C. § 1801(2)(3)(4) (1982) stated that the Act was based upon the following findings:
(2) As a consequence of increased fishing pressure and because of the inad-
equacy of fishery conservation and management practices and controls (A) cer-
tain stocks of such fish have been overfished to the point where their survival is
threatened, and (B) other such stocks have been so substantially reduced in
number that they could become similarly threatened.
(3) Commercial and recreational fishing constitutes a major source of em-
ployment and contributes significantly to the economy of the Nation. Many
coastal areas are dependent upon fishing and related activities, and their econo-
mies have been badly damaged by the overfishing of fishery resources at an ever-
increasing rate over the past decade. The activities of massive foreign fishing
fleets in waters adjacent to such coastal areas have contributed to such damage,
interfered with domestic fishing efforts, and caused destruction of the fishing
gear of United States fishermen.
(4) International fishery agreements have not been effective in preventing or
terminating the overfishing of these valuable fishery resources. There is danger
that irreversible effects from overfishing will take place before an effective inter-
national agreement on fishery management jurisdiction can be negotiated,
signed, ratified, and implemented.
In his statement made upon signing the FCMA, President Ford stated:
I am today signing a bill which provides a comprehensive domestic and in-
ternational program for the conservation and management of our fisheries.
The extension of our jurisdiction to 200 miles will enable us to protect and
conserve the valuable fisheries off our coasts. It is indeed unfortunate that the
slow pace of the negotiations of the United Nations Law of the Sea Conference
has mandated our course of action here today. However, the foreign overfishing
off our coasts cannot be allowed to continue without resolution.
A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra, at 34.
7. Id.
The need for a timely and successful Law of the Sea Conference is even
more pressing today than ever before. I have directed our negotiators to make
every effort, consistent with our basic interests, to conclude the substantive nego-
tiations this year. The bill I sign today is generally consistent with the consensus
emerging at the Conference. It is increasingly apparent that a failure to reach
silbstantive agreement this year will move the world community inevitably to-
ward disorder respecting competing use of the oceans. In the absence of a timely
treaty, no nation can be assured that its paramount interest in the oceans will be
protected.
Some specific aspects of this legislation require comment. I supported this
legislation on the condition that the effective date of the legislation would be
delayed so that the Law of the Sea Conference could complete its work and to
permit sufficient time for a proper transition.
The tasks of continuing our negotiating efforts at the Law of the Sea Con-
ference and at the same time establishing new fishery plans, issuing hundreds of
new fishing permits and negotiating specific fishery agreements with foreign gov-
ernments will require substantial resources in excess of those presently allocated
to international fisheries affairs. The Departments of State, Commerce, and
Transportation must do their best to implement the act fully. Since available
resources are finite, however, it is possible that full implementation may take
more time than is provided in the act.
8. The United States' primary objections to the UNCLOS Treaty revolve around the
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However, this article will examine the potential serious impact on
traditional patterns of fishery management in the United States if
the treaty is eventually signed. Preemption, a process by which the
federal government takes over fishery management within the
coastal states' territorial waters, 9 may be facilitated, and in some
cases required, if the Treaty is adopted."0
II. Traditional United States Fisheries Management Practices
The original thirteen colonies inherited from England rights to
fisheries much as they obtained other more familiar principles of An-
glo-Saxon jurisprudence. The United States Supreme Court has con-
sistently recognized a dual state/national dichotomy in fisheries
Treaty's deep seabed mining provisions. Very simply, the Treaty provides for parallel private
and international development of the mineral resources of the deep seabed. Part XI of the
Treaty outlines the division of authority between international and private interests. The deep
seabed, known as the "Area," is governed by a number of governmental organs. UNCLOS
Treaty, supra note 2, at arts. 136, 156-70. The Authority is the body which controls the Area.
Id. at art. 158. All member nations make up the Authority. The Assembly also is made up of
all members of the Authority. The Assembly is the general legislative body. Id. at arts. 159-
160. The Council is made up of 36 members of the Authority and is the executive organ of the
Authority. Id. at arts. 161-162. The Enterprise runs leasing and mining operations in the Area.
Id. at art. 170.
The Area is to be leased to private concerns who are required to develop their plots after
paying the Enterprise and transferring technology to the Enterprise where appropriate. Id. at
arts. 170-172 and Annex Ill.
In outlining his objections to the Treaty, President Reagan identified the following per-
ceived deficiencies:
These decisions reflect the deep conviction that the United States cannot
support a deep seabed mining regime with such major problems. In our view,
those problems include:
Provisions that would actually deter future development of deep sea-
bed mineral resources, when such development should serve the interest
of all countries.
A decisionmaking process that would not give the United States or
others a role that fairly reflects and protects their interests.
Provisions that would allow amendments to enter into force for the
United States without its approval. This is clearly incompatible with the
United States approach to such treaties.
Stipulations relating to mandatory transfer of private technology and
the possibility of national liberation movements sharing in benefits.
The absence of assured access for future qualified deep seabed 'min-
ers to promote the development of these resources.
We recognize that world demand and markets currently do not justify com-
mercial development of deep seabed mineral resources, and it is not clear when
such development will be justified. When such factors become favorable, how-
ever, the deep seabed represents a potentially important source of strategic and
other minerals. The aim of the United States in this regard has been to establish
with other nations an order that would allow exploration and development under
reasonable terms and conditions.
Public Papers of the Presidents' of the United States - Ronald Reagan, July 3 to Dec. 31,
1982 Bk. II at 911-912.
9. Territorial waters are those waters over which the coastal state and/or coastal na-
tion exercises sovereign rights. The territorial waters of most coastal states in the United
States is 3 nautical miles as measured from the baseline which delineates inland water from
territorial waters.
10. 16 U.S.C. § 1856(b) (1982).
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management." In Martin v. Waddell, 2 the Court was asked to de-
termine title to ownership of 100 acres of submerged lands in Perth
Amboy, New Jersey. The dispute arose because the State of New
Jersey set aside an area of submerged lands for oyster growing. 3
Merritt Martin had received a lease to the submerged lands in ques-
tion from the state.' The lessee of Waddell brought an action in
ejectment, claiming ownership of the tract. He traced title to the
original charter granted to the Duke of York by Charles 11.1'
The Supreme Court discussed at length the status of submerged
lands in England and the rights of the people to use that land as a
common resource. 16 The Court likened the King's authority over
submerged lands to that of a trustee.' 7 The Court reasoned that this
status was transferred to the Duke of York.' 8 When the Duke as-
signed his interests in the lands to a number of proprietors, they too
stood as trustees over the submerged lands and fishery resources. 19
In 1702, the proprietors of the land at issue in the Martin v.
Waddell case surrendered their interests back to the crown.' 0 The
Court believed that this reconveyance included the trusteeship over
the submerged lands because the surrender documents failed to re-
serve any rights to the proprietors or their grantees .2 1 The impor-
1I. The FCMA still recognizes this dual role, but the preemption provision in the Act
is a product of the cases and analysis to follow.
12. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367 (1842).
13. Id. at 379.
14. Id. at 379-80.
15. id. at 407-08.
16. Id. at 408-14.
17. Id. at 411-12. The Court's opinion is very hard to follow at this juncture. In one
breath the Chief Justice reviews English law concerning submerged lands lying under naviga-
ble waters and likens the Crown's control to that of a trustee. Id. at 411-12. In the next breath
he suggests the lengthy history is of little consequence and title must be tried by "different"
principles because the American colonies broke away from the Crown. Id.
In analyzing the interest received by individuals tracing title to a charter from the Duke,
Chief Justice Taney returns again to English common law. Id. at 411. Finally Taney settles on
the idea that the Duke could not, as a trustee, transfer title. Id. at 411-12.
The case is important, too, as an example of the early acceptance by the Court of the
Public Trust Theory later fully articulated in Illinois Central Railroad v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387
(1892).
18. Martin v. Waddell, 41 U.S. at 412 (1842).
19. Id. at 415-16.
20. Id. at 415.
21. Id. at 416. The Court suggested that had the control of the submerged lands been
reserved by the proprietors the instruments facilitating the retransfer back to the crown would
have specifically included such reservations. Id. The Court stated:
The surrender, according to its evident object and meaning, restored them in the
same plight and condition in which they originally came to the Lands of the
Duke of York. Whatever he held as a royal or perogative right, was restored,
with the political power to which it was incident. And if the great right of do-
minion and ownership in the rivers, bays, and arms of the sea, and the soils
under them, were to have been severed from the sovereignty . . . this important
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tance of tracing the ownership of the land lies in the fact that after
the American Revolution, the then independent sovereign states ac-
quired the property in trust for their people subject only to the pow-
ers relinquished to the federal government when the Constitution
was passed 2 and any grants to private land owners.
The Court in McCready v. Virginia reiterated the status of the
states as owners of the fish and submerged land within their jurisdic-
tion.23 However, the Court in McCready began the process of identi-
fying those rights relinquished to the national government by the
States upon entry to the union. The right to regulate navigation was
one such power, according to the Court's rationale.24 In determining
whether Virginia could prohibit the citizens of other states from
planting oysters on submerged lands within the state, the Court
stated:
The title thus is held subject to navigation, the paramount right,
the regulation of which, in respect to foreign and inter-state
commerce, has been granted to the United States. There has
been, however, no such grant of power over the exclusive control
of the States, which has consequently the right, in its discretion,
to appropriate its tide waters and their beds to be used by its
people as a common for taking and cultivating fish, so far as it
may be done without obstructing navigation. 25
This right, according to the Court's analysis, is a property right.26
Later, in other opinions, the Court changed its interpretation and
definition of the interest, but preserved the conclusion that each state
retains control over resources within its territorial waters.2 7
Before the Court began distinguishing and limiting the decision
in McCready v. Virginia,28 it reaffirmed the states' primary role in
22. Id. at 410.
23. 94 U.S. 391 (1876). The Court stated:
The principle has long been settled in this court, that each State owns the
beds of all tide waters within its jurisdiction, unless they have been granted
away. Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan, 3 How. 212; Smith v. Maryland., 18 How. 74;
Mumford v. Wardwell, 6 Wall., 436; Weber v. Commissioners, 18 id. 66. In like
manner, the States own the tide waters themselves, and the fish in them, so far
as they are. capable of ownership while running. For this purpose the State rep-
resents its People, and the ownership is that of the People in their united sover-
eignty. Martin v. Waddell, 16 Pet. 410.
Id. at 394.
24. Id. at 394-95.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 395. The Court stated:
Such an appropriation is, in effect, nothing more than a regulation of the
use by the People of their common property. The right which the People of the
State thus acquire comes not from their citizenship alone, but from their citizen-
ship and property combined. It is, in fact, a property right, and not a mere
privilege or immunity of citizenship.
27. See, e.g., Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385 (1948).
28. See, e.g., Manchester v. Massachusetts, 139 U.S. 240 (1890).
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Spring 1986] PREEMPTION AND UNCLOS
managing their inland and tide water fisheries.29 However, in inter-
preting a Massachusetts statute regulating the taking of menhaden °
in Buzzard's Bay, the Court reflected:
If there be a liberty of fishing or swimming in the navigable
waters of the United States common to the citizens of the
United States, upon which we express no opinion, the statute
may well be considered as an impartial and reasonable regula-
tion of this liberty; and the subject is one which a state may well
be permitted to regulate within its territory, in the absence of
any regulation by the United States.3'
This seemingly innocuous statement signaled a retreat by the
Court from the exclusive control/property concept. In Toomer v.
Witse/132 the Court interpreted a South Carolina statute which im-
posed a license fee on shrimp fishing in the territorial sea off its
coast.3 3 The statute required a fee 100 times greater for non-resident
fishermen than for resident fishermen. In determining the constitu-
tionality of the statute under the privileges and immunities clause of
the Constitution,34 the Court confronted clashing of state and federal
constitutional interests regarding the management of a fishery lo-
cated in state territorial waters and beyond.35
The state of South Carolina vigorously argued that an exception
to the privilege and immunities clause existed for regulation of fish-
eries within state jurisdiction." The state argued that animals ferae
naturae belonged to the state and its people for the benefit of the
citizens of the state.37 The Court, while conceding that some of its
29. Id. at 262-63.
30. Menhaden are small school fish which in tonnage account for the majority of the
total United States fishing catch. Douglas v. Seacoast, 431 U.S. 265, 269 n.3 (1971).
31. Id. at 265.
32. Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385 (1948).
33. Id. at 387-88.
34. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1.
35. Id. at 393-94.
36. Id. at 399.
37. Id. The full statement of the state's position as understood by the Court was:
Appellees strenuously urge that there is such an exception. Their argument
runs as follows: Ever since Roman times, animalsferae naturae, not having been
reduced to individual possession and ownership, have been considered as res nul-
lius or part of the "negative community of interests" and hence subject to con-
trol by the sovereign or other governmental authority. More recently this
thought has been expressed by saying that fish and game are the common prop-
erty of all citizens of the governmental unit and that the government, as a sort of
trustee, exercises this "ownership" for the benefit of its citizens. In the case of
fish, it has also been considered that each government "owned" both the beds of
its lakes, streams, and tidewaters and the waters themselves; hence it must also
"own" the fish within those waters. Each government may, the argument contin-
ues, regulate the corpus of the trust in the way best suited to the interests of the
beneficial owners, its citizens, and may discriminate as it sees fit against persons
lacking any beneficial interest. Finally, it is said that this special property inter-
est, which nations and similar governmental bodies have traditionally had, in
this country vested in the colonial governments and passed to the individual
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opinions, including McCready v. Virginia38 seemed to support the
state's position, distinguished the cases.3 9
First, the Court pointed out that in McCready, Virginia was
regulating oysters, a sessile 40 animal living its entire life in the same
place. Shrimp, however, are migratory, often crossing state lines of
jurisdiction., 1 Second, the McCready case involved a statute affect-
ing fish in inland waters.4
The Court then proceeded to announce that the exception in
McCready was limited to the facts of the case and that the owner-
ship theory therein was inapplicable to the shrimp regulation in
question in the Toomer case."' While conceding that the states had
some authority in the marginal sea over both migratory and non-
migratory animals, the Court cautioned the states against treating
such animals as property:
The whole ownership theory, in fact, is now generally re-
garded as but a fiction expressive in legal shorthand of the im-
portance to its people that a state have power to preserve and
regulate the exploitation of an important resource. And there is
no necessary conflict between that vital policy consideration and
the constitutional command that the state exercise that power
like its other powers, so as not to discriminate without reason
against citizens of other states.
4 4
This contraction of state authority was a logical offshoot of the en-
tire dispute between the states and the United States over ownership
of submerged lands in the territorial waters and the mineral revenue
therefrom. 5
States.
38. Id. at 401.
39. Id.
40. Id. Sessile is the biological term for being immobile. The term refers to animals
such as clams, oysters and scallops.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 401-02.
44. Id. at 402.
45. Ann Hollick, in her book, U.S. Foreign Policy and the Law of the Sea, suggests
that Secretary of the Interior Harold Ickes lobbied President Roosevelt to push claims of fed-
eral ownership over submerged lands offshore in order to ensure that mineral revenues went to
the federal government following oil exploration and development. A. HOLLICK, U.S. FOREIGN
POILCY AND THE LAW OF THE SEA 36-37 (1981) [hereinafter cited as U.S. FOREIGN POLICY].
Ickes' design won the first round of battles when the Supreme Court in 1947 ruled that
the United States had paramount rights to lands underlying the territorial sea of California.
United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19 (1947). In 1950 the same decision was made with
reference to the waters of Texas and Louisiana. United States v. Louisiana, 339 U.S. 699
(1950).
In 1953, in reaction to these decisions, Congress passed the Submerged Lands Act, 43
U.S.C. §§ 1301-1356 (1982), which re-established state control over those lands. U.S. FOR-
EIGN POLICY, supra. The legislation provided the following boundary definition:
The seaward boundary of each original coastal State is approved and con-
firmed as a line three geographical miles distant from its coast line or, in the
[Vol. 4:2
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The Supreme Court continued its redefinition and clarification
of the states' power to regulate fishery resources in Dougals v. Sea-
coast ,46 a case interpreting a Virginia statute designed to insure that
non-residents not be permitted to catch menhaden in parts of Chesa-
peake Bay and the state's territorial waters. 7 The state required that
only citizens of the United States could get a license and that a cor-
poration seeking such a license must have seventy-five percent of its
stock owned by United States citizens. 8 Seacoast Products, Inc., a
leading company producing menhaden products, was owned primar-
ily by a British corporation:49
In striking down the Virginia statute, the Supreme Court used
part of the rationale in Gibbons v. Ogden to justify its decision.6 0
The Court reasoned that Gibbons v. Ogden required federally li-
censed vessels, such as those owned by Seacoast, to be treated fairly
and reasonably by the states.51 States, the Court reasoned, may im-
pose nondiscriminatory conservation and environmental protection
measures on foreign vessels, as they do on their own. In so holding,
the Court further relied on its rationale in Manchester v. Massachu-
setts52 to the effect that the statute passed by Massachusetts was
adopted for the preservation of fish and was therefore non-
discriminatory. 3
A recent decision by the Court has probably put an end to the
last vestiges of the state ownership theory in any waters subject to
both state and federal control. In Hughes v. Oklahoma54 the state
legislature's statute prohibiting the sale (outside the state) of min-
case of the Great Lakes, to the international boundary. Any State admitted sub-
sequent to the formation of the Union which has not already done so may extend
its seaward boundaries to a line three geographical miles distant from its coast
line, or to the international boundaries of the United States in the Great Lakes
or any other body of water traversed by such boundaries. Any claim heretofore
or hereafter asserted either by constitutional provisions, statute, or otherwise,
indicating the intent of a State so to extend its boundaries is approved and con-
firmed, without prejudice to its claim, if any it has, that its boundaries extend
beyond that line. Nothing in this section is to be construed as questioning or in
any manner prejudicing the existence of any State's seaward boundary beyond
three geographical miles if it was so provided by its constitution or laws prior to
or at the time such State became a member of the Union, or if it has been
heretofore approved by Congress.
43 U.S.C. § 1312 (1976).
The last sentence permitted Texas and Florida (on her Gulf side) to have 3 marine league
territorial seas. This explains the unevenness of the shoreward boundary of the Fishery Conser-
vation Zone. (For more on the FCZ see infra note 62 and accompanying text).
46. 431 U.S. 265 (1977).
47. Id. at 267-68.
48. Id. at 268.
49. Id. at 269-70.
50. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
51. Douglas v. Seacoast, 431 U.S. at 275-277.
52. 139 U.S. 159.
53. Douglas v. Seacoast, 431 U.S. at 277-78.
54. 441 U.S. 322 (1977).
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nows caught in Oklahoma was struck down as violative of the Com-
merce Clause. The Court reviewed the history of its interpretation of
cases involving the regulation of fish and game resources, reiterating
its rejection of the old ownership analysis . 5 Any remaining excep-
tion to the rule that states may treat citizens of other states in a
discriminatory manner on the basis of an ownership theory was re-
jected by the Court in Hughes in unequivocal language.56
These cases leave the states with the authority to manage the
fishery resources in their inland and territorial waters but clearly il-
lustrate that these management schemes are subject to paramount
national interests."1 In 1976, the states' interests in managing fishery
resources were further defined by the adoption of the Fishery Con-
servation and Management Act (FCMA). 58
III. The FCMA: Structure and Purpose
The Fishery Conservation and Management Act was enacted by
Congress and signed by President Ford for a variety of reasons. Both
foreign and domestic fishing pressure had resulted in overfishing
55. Id. at 325-35. In Hughes the Court overruled its decision in .Geer v. Connecticut,
161 U.S. 519 (1896). Geer was a decision which had used an ownership theory to interpret a
Connecticut statute which prohibited the transportation of game animals from the state. Id. at
521. The Court reviewed international law on the status of ferae naturae, coming to a conclu-
sion that the enactment was constitutional. Id. at 522-35. It also reviewed its own decisions
such as McCready v. Virginia with approval. Id. at 528. The Court in Hughes believed Geer
and Hughes were on all fours. Hughes, 441 U.S. at 335.
56. Hughes, 441 U.S. at 335-36. The Court stated in putting the fictitious ownership
theory to rest:
We now conclude that challenges under the Commerce Clause to state regula-
tions of wild animals should be considered according to the same general rule
applied to state regulations of other natural resources, and therefore expressly
overrule Geer. We thus bring our analytical framework into conformity with
practical realities. Overruling Geer also eliminates the anomaly, created by the
decisions distinguishing Geer, that statutes imposing the most extreme burdens
on interstate commerce (essentially total embargoes) were the most immune
from challenge. At the same time, the general rule we adopt in this case makes
ample allowance for preserving, in ways not inconsistent with the Commerce
Clause, the legitimate state concerns for conservation and protection of wild ani-
mals underlying the 19th century legal fiction of state ownership.
57. Id. at 337-38. The Court pointed out:
The State's interest in maintaining the ecological balance in state waters by
avoiding the removal of inordinate numbers of minnows may well qualify as a
legitimate local purpose. We consider the States' interests in conservation and
protection of wild animals as legitimate local purposes similar to the States' in-
terests in protecting the health and safety of their citizens [citations omitted].
But the scope of legitimate state interests in "conservation" is narrower under
this analysis than it was under Geer. A State may no longer "keep the property,
if the sovereign so chooses always within its jurisdiction for every purpose." Geer
v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. at 530. The fiction of state ownership may no longer be
used to force those outside the State to bear the full costs of "conserving" the
wild animals within its borders when equally effective nondiscriminatory conser-
vation measures are available.
58. 16 U.S.C. § 1801.
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which threatened the depletion of several major fish stocks. 9 At-
tempts at the regulation of fisheries important to the United States
through the use of international agreements met with little success.6 0
Negotiations on the Law of the Sea Treaty, designed in part to de-
fine and regulate participation of foreign fishing vessels in fisheries
off coastal nations' shores, dragged on, offering little immediate help
to overfished populations. 61
To varying degrees, these factors culminated in the adoption of
a federal system of management for United States' fisheries. The
FCMA regulates fisheries in an area called the Fishery Conservation
Zone (FCZ).12 The Act is designed to promote conservation and
59. A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 6, at 433. Senator Pastore stated:
I am concerned about further delay and I remain skeptical about the effec-
tiveness of international negotiation despite some heralded successes in establish-
ing overall fishing quotas by the International Commission for the Northwest
Atlantic Fisheries (ICNAF) recently.
My concerns flow from the general and fundamental lack of success of
ICNAF, a vehicle for international negotiation, over the past quarter century.
Now ICNAF was established when the Northwest Atlantic - the fishing
grounds of New England, the Georgia Bank and the Grand Banks - was still
the richest and most prolific fishing grounds in the world.
With ICNAF watching these great fishing grounds, which New Englanders
fished for centuries without doing ecological damage, the foreign fleets moved in
and decimated the largest stocks of fish in the world.
Not until the very existence of the haddock was immediately threatened did
ICNAF take firm action. But damage to the haddock was so great that the
member nations of ICNAF were forced to clamp a ban on all directed fishing for
haddock.
Id. Senator Hathaway from Maine echoed his colleagues' distress:
The effects of foreign fishing has been especially acute off the New England
coast. In a particularly rich fisheries area - that of Georgia Bank - 88 percent
of the total catch was taken by U.S. fishermen as recently as 1960. As of 1972,
the figures were turned around and foreign fishing accounted for over 89 percent
of the total catch from the Georgia Bank area. In just 12 years the relative catch
of U.S. and foreign fisherman was reversed. This statistic reflects untold eco-
nomic disruption for our individual fishermen and, of course, an increasingly ad-
verse balance of payments for the Nation as increasing market demand for fish
products has been met by imports. Testifying before the Small Business Com-
mittee last spring at hearings on the "Economic and Loan Problems of the Fish-
eries Industry," Richard Reed of the Maine Sardine Council surveyed the dam-
age done by foreign fishing to the sardine industry. He said that from 1941 to
1960, the sardine business had an average pack of about 2 million cases a year.
From 1962 to 1975, after foreign fishing started in earnest, the average pack was
from 900,000 to I million per year. He felt that foreign fishing was resulting in
the taking of the larger, strong fish and that a decline in the number of juveniles
was taking place.
At these hearings, fisherman after fisherman stressed the need for extension
of the fisheries limits as a necessary first step correcting this situation: and sig-
nificantly, they recognized that extended jurisdiction was not a complete or sim-
ple answer to a complex situation, but rather than each of them - and the
industry as a whole - would have to cooperate in conservation efforts for the
sake of the preservation of the industry itself.
Id. at 450.
60. See Maine v. Kreps, 563 F.2d 1043, 1045-56 (lst Cir. 1977); A LEGISLATIVE HIS-
TORY, supra note 6, at 433-50.
61. A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 6, at 433-50.
62. 16 U.S.C. § 1811 (1982). The section reads:
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management through fishery management plans (FMPs) consistent
with national standards enumerated therein.6 3
FMPs are created by regional fishery management councils con-
sisting of representatives from state fishery management agencies,
representatives of the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS),
and a number of individuals nominated by the governor of coastal
states to represent industry, recreational fishermen and the public."'
Each FMP adopted by the regional council determines the maxi-
mum sustainable yield (MSY) and the optimum sustainable yield
(OY) for the fishery.65 The plan must identify that part of the OY
which on an annual basis will not be harvested by domestic fisher-
men."6 The amount not harvested is to be allocated to participating
There is established a zone contiguous to the territorial sea of the United States
to be known as the fishery conservation zone. The inner boundary of the fishery
conservation zone is a line coterminous with the seaward boundary of each of the
coastal States, and the outer boundary of such zone is a line drawn in such a
manner that each point is 200 nautical miles from the baseline from which the
territorial sea is measured.
63. 16 U.S.C. § 1851 (1982).
(a) In general. Any fishery management plan prepared, and any regulation
promulgated to implement any such plan, pursuant to this title [16 USCS §§
1851 et seq.] shall be consistent with the following national standards for fishery
conservation and management.
(I) Conservation and management measures shall prevent overfishing
while achieving, on a continuing basis, the optimum yield from each
fishery.
(2) Conservation and management measures shall be based upon the best
scientific information available.
(3) To the extent practicable, an individual stock of fish shall be managed
as a unit throughout its range, and interrelated stocks of fish shall be
managed as a unit or in close coordination.
(4) Conservation and management measures shall not discriminate be-
tween residents of different States. If it becomes necessary to allocate or
assign fishing privileges among various United States fishermen, such al-
location shall be
(A) fair and equitable to all such fishermen;
(B) reasonably calculated to promote conservation; and
(C) carried out in such manner that no particular individual, corpora-
tion, or other entity acquires an excessive share of such privileges.
Id.
64. 16 U.S.C. § 1852.
65. 16 U.S.C. § 1802(18). The term "optimum," with respect to the yield from a fish-
ery, means the amount of fish
(A) which will provide the greatest overall benefit to the Nation, with particular
reference to food production and recreational opportunities; and
(B) which is prescribed as such on the basis of the maximum sustainable yield
from such fishery, as modified by any relevant economic, social or ecological
factor.
Id.
Maximum sustainable yield (MSY) is not defined in the FCMA, but has been judicially
interpreted to mean the following:
a scientific appraisal of the safe upper limit of harvest which can be
taken consistently year after year without diminishing the stock so that the stock
is truly inexhaustible and perpetually renewable.
Maine v. Kreps, 563 F.2d at 1047 n.4, citing H.R. Rep. No. 445, 94th Cong., Ist Sess. 48
(1975).
66. 16 U.S.C. § 1853(a)(4).
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foreign fishing interests.67
Each FMP is reviewed by the United States Secretary of Com-
merce to ensure compliance with national standards. 8 In this review,
the Secretary consults with the Secretary of State on the plan's pro-
visions regulating foreign fishing. 9 In limited circumstances, the
Secretary of Commerce, in conjunction with the Secretary of State,
is required to.prepare an FMP.7°
As noted above, the regulation of foreign fishing on traditionally
domestic fishing grounds was one of the motivations behind the pas-
sage of the FCMA. Briefly, foreign fishing is permitted in the FCZ
when, under a treaty or other agreement, the foreign nation and its
nationals agree to follow the FCMA and its regulations.7' The for-
eign nation and its nationals are prohibited by the Act from exceed-
ing their allocation of the total allowable level of foreign fishing.72
Through the use of FMPs, state, national, and foreign fishing
interests are taken into account. The Act, of course, presupposes that
state management of fishing resources which migrate from state to
state and from state to waters in the FCZ will not seriously disrupt
an FMP scheme. Many species, such as shrimp, spend part of their
lives in state inland and territorial waters as well as in the FCZ. a
The Regional Management Council prepares a plan to manage
67. 16 U.S.C. § 1821(d).
68. 16 U.S.C. § 1854(a)(l)(A). See also supra note 63.
69. 16 U.S.C. § 1854(a)(2)(C).
70. 16 U.S.C. § 1854(c). This section addresses inaction or refusal to act by a Council
after the Secretary of Commerce has asked for a plan to be revised or if no plan has been
prepared within a reasonable time.
71. 16 U.S.C. § 1821.
72. Id. See also suprd note 67 and accompanying text.
73. J. CLARK, COASTAL ECOSYSTEMS 26-27 (1983) [hereinafter cited as COASTAL
ECOSYSTEMS]. Clark describes the movement of shrimp thusly:
Shrimps are found along all U.S. coasts. Many are commercially useful and
all are essential to the food web. The peneid shrimps of the South Atlantic and
Gulf Coasts (the brown, pink and white) are the most valuable commercially.
The diet of various species appears to consist of plant detritus and small crus-
taceans, worms, and various larvae. Although most species are oceanic residents
as adults, the estuary fulfills two primary functions for certain life stages of
these shrimps: (I) provision of adequate nourishment during a period of rapid
physical growth and (2) protection from predators.
The pink shrimp, abundant in the Gulf of Mexico, spawns offshore in water
100 to 150 feet deep. The larvae move and drift with currents toward the main-
land for three to five weeks while passing through a series of developmental
stages and growing to a size of about inch. They enter the inlets and within
the estuary they grow rapidly, reaching commercial size in two to four months
before returning to the sea to complete their life cycle. The closely related brown
shrimp spawns offshore in depth of 150 to 230 feet. The young move inshore to
remain for several weeks in the estuary. The other important Gulf of Mexico
species, the white shrimp, inhabits water less than 100 feet deep and has a life
cycle similar to the brown shrimp although it resembles the pink shrimp in hav-
ing a greater affinity for fresh water.
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shrimp in the FCZ.74 If the Council's strategy differs dramatically
from that of the states in the Council, the FMP's success can be
destroyed .75
To prevent this type of clash, the FCMA contains a provision
which preempts state management under certain circumstances. 76
The preemption provision can be triggered only when a fishery is
located predominantly in the FCZ and outside the FCZ a state has
taken or failed to take any action which will substantially and ad-
versely affect the success of the FMP.77
Although it has not yet been used or challenged, the preemption
provision is clearly constitutional and is a logical further inroad on
the fishery management authority of the states.78 On balance, the
74. 16 U.S.C. § 1852(h).
75. 16 U.S.C. § 1854(b).
76. 16 U.S.C. § 1856(b).
77. Id. This section reads:
(b) Exception.
(I) If the Secretary finds, after notice and an opportunity for a hearing in
accordance with section 554 of title 5, United States Code [5 USCS §
5541, that -
(A) the fishing in a fishery, which is covered by a fishery management
plan implemented under this Act, is engaged in predominately within
the fishery conservation zone and beyond such zone; and
(B) any State has taken any action, or omitted to take any action, the
results of which will substantially and adversely affect the carrying out
of such fishery management plan;
the Secretary shall promptly notify the State and the appropriate Council
of such finding and of his intention to regulate the applicable fishery
within the boundaries of such State (other than its internal waters), pur-
suant to such fishery management plan and the regulations promulgated
to implement such plan.
(2) If the Secretary, pursuant to this subsection, assumes responsibility
for the regulation of any fishery, the State involved may at any time
thereafter apply to the Secretary for reinstatement of its authority over
such fishery. If the Secretary finds that the reasons for which he assumed
such regulation no longer prevail, he shall promptly terminate such
regulation.
78. The thesis of this paper is that Section 1856(b) gives the Secretary authority to
preempt pursuant to the Act's provisions. It is arguable that in light of the case law discussed
above and the Submerged Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1301-56, that the United States could
successfully challenge management policies without using the FCMA. It is clear that the
United States retained rights in the area of the states' territorial seas. United States v. Califor-
nia, 332 U.S. 19 (1946). This case precipitated the passage of the Submerged Lands Act. In
its opinion, the Court addressed the United States' power in the territorial sea area:
What this Government does, or even what the states do, anywhere in the ocean,
is a subject upon which the nation may enter into and assume treaty or similar
international obligations [citations omitted]. The very oil about which the state
and nation here contend might well become the subject of international dispute
and settlement.
The ocean, even its three mile belt, is thus of vital consequence to the nation
in its desire to engage in commerce and to live in peace with the world; it also
becomes of crucial importance should it ever again become impossible to pre-
serve that peace.
Id. at 35. The Court found the United States had paramount rights in the area. Id. at 35-36.
The Submerged Lands Act recognized these paramount rights even as it conveyed to the states
control over the resources of the territorial seas. Section 6(a) of that Act states:
The United States retains all its navigational servitude and rights in and
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FCMA, standing alone, gives the states a valuable voice in foreign
fishery policy and in other states' management schemes. 9 The value
of the Act to the states may be severely threatened, however, by the
UNCLOS Treaty's provisions on fisheries.
IV. UNCLOS and Fisheries
The UNCLOS Treaty recognizes the importance of wise fishery
management to the coastal nation and the international community.
The Treaty's codification of a zone beyond the territorial sea within
which a coastal state exercises paramount sovereign rights over liv-
ing and nonliving resources to a large extent resulted because of in-
creasing international fishing pressure on historic coastal state fisher-
ies.80 This zone is termed by the Treaty to be the "Exclusive
Economic Zone" (EEZ).81
The EEZ is defined as an area beyond and adjacent to the terri-
torial sea. The zone's breadth is to be no greater than 200 nautical
miles from the baseline from which the breadth of the territorial sea
is measured. 2 The Treaty gives a coastal nation sovereign rights in
the EEZ for the purpose of exploring, exploiting and managing the
living and nonliving resources of the area. 83 The Treaty also makes
powers of regulation and control of said lands and navigable waters for the con-
stitutional purposes of commerce, navigation, national defense, and international
affairs, all of which shall be paramount to, but shall not be deemed to include,
proprietary rights of ownership, or the rights of management, administration,
leasing, use, and development of the lands and natural resources which are spe-
cifically recognized, confirmed, established, and vested in and assigned to the
respective States and others by section 3 of this Act.
79. See MacRae, The Fishery Conservation and Management Act: The States' Role in
Domestic and International Fishery Management, 88 DICK. L. REV. 306 (1982) [hereinafter
cited as MacRae].
80. See A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 6, at 34-35.
81. UNCLOS Treaty, supra note 2, at Pt. V arts. 55-75, pp. 1279-1284.
82. Id. at art. 57, p. 1280.
83. Id. at art. 56, p. 1280 which states:
Article 56
Rights, jurisdiction and duties of the coastal State in the exclusive eco-
nomic zone
I. In the exclusive economic zone, the coastal State has:
(a) sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting, conserv-
ing and managing the natural resources, whether living or non-living, of
the waters superjacent to the sea-bed and of the sea-bed and its subsoil,
and with regard to other activities for the economic exploitation and ex-
ploration of the zone, such as the production of energy from the water,
currents and winds;
(b) jurisdiction as provided for in the relevant provisions of this Conven-
tion with regard to:
(i) the establishment and use of artificial islands, installations and
structures;
(ii) marine scientific research;
(iii) the protection and preservation of the marine environment;
(c) other rights and duties provided for in this Convention.
2. In exercising its rights and performing its duties under this Convention in
the exclusive economic zone, the coastal State shall have due regard to the rights
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the coastal state primarily responsible for the conservation of the liv-
ing resources in the zone. 84
In carrying out its conservation function, the coastal nation is
obilgated to prevent overexploitation. 85 In accomplishing its function,
the coastal state is charged with designing a management scheme
based on a MSY model as qualified by relevant economic and envi-
ronmental factors.86 In addition, the coastal nation's management
scheme is required to take special steps to recognize developing na-
tions' needs in the fisheries.
The coastal nation has an affirmative duty to promote optimum
utilization of the living resources while maintaining the concept of a
socially modified MSY. The nation is required to allocate portions of
the allowable catch to other nations when the coastal nation's har-
vesting capacity is not large enough to bring in the entire MSY. 87
and duties of other States and shall act in a manner compatible with the provi-
sions of this Convention.
3. The rights set out in this article with respect to the sea-bed and subsoil shall
be exercised in accordance with Part VI.
84. Id. at art, 61, p. 1281. Article 61 states:
Article 61
Conservation of the living resources
I. The coastal State shall determine the allowable catch of the living resources
in its exclusive economic zone.
2. The coastal State, taking into account the best scientific evidence available
to it, shall ensure through proper conservation and management measure that
the maintenance of the living resources in the exclusive economic zone is not
endangered by over-exploitation. As appropriate, the coastal State and compe-
tent international organizations, whether subregional, regional or global, shall
co-operate to this end.
3. Such measures shall also be designed to maintain or restore populations of
harvested species at levels which can produce the maximum sustainable yield, as
qualified by relevant environmental and economic factors, including the eco-
nomic needs of coastal fishing communities and the special requirements of de-
veloping States, and taking into account fishing patterns, the interdependence of
stocks and any generally recommended international minimum standards,
whether subregional, regional or global.
4. In taking such measures the coastal State shall take into consideration the
effects on species associated with or dependent upon harvested species with a
view to maintaining or restoring populations of such associated or dependent
species above levels at which their reproduction may become seriously
threatened.
5. Available scientific information, catch and fishing effort statistics, and other
data relevant to the conservation of fish stocks shall be contributed and ex-
changed on a regular basis through competent international organizations,
whether subregional, regional or global, where appropriate and with participa-
tion by all States concerned, including States whose nationals are allowed to fish
in the exclusive economic zone.
85. Id. at art. 61(2).
86. Id.
87. Id. at art. 62(2). This provisions states:
The coastal State shall determine its capacity to harvest the living resources
of the exclusive economic zone. Where the coastal State does not have the ca-
pacity to harvest the entire allowable catch, it shall, through agreements or other
arrangements and pursuant to the terms, conditions, laws and regulations re-
ferred to in paragraph 4, give other States access to the surplus of the allowable
catch, having particular regard to the provisions of articles 69 or 70, especially
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Two coastal nations that have the same stock or stocks of asso-
ciated species within the EEZ of both nations have the duty to co-
-ordinate their conservation efforts.88 Other provisions of the Treaty
outline the duties of coastal nations over catadromous89 and
anadramous o species.9"
The Treaty requires that coastal nations allow land-locked na-
tions access to the surplus allowable catch equal to the access of
other coastal nations.92 Similar provisions permit geographically dis-
advantaged 93 states to have equal access as well. 9 ' The Treaty is
designed to alleviate the ineffectiveness of prior international fishery
management schemes by granting primary authority to the nation
having the greatest self-interest.
V. The UNCLOS Fishery Provisions and the States
It is evident that the UNCLOS Treaty's fishing provisions envi-
sion an international solution to fishing disputes.95 For nations which
in relation to the developing States mentioned therein.
88. Id. at art. 63.
89. Catadramous fish - A fish which goes back to salt water
to spawn after having lived most of its life in fresh water.
90. Anadramous fish - A fish which goes back to fresh water to spawn after living the
majority of its life in salt water.
91. UNCLOS Treaty, supra note 2, at Pt. V, arts. 66-67.
92. Id. at art. 69.
93. Id. at art. 70. A geographically disadvantaged country is defined as:
. .. coastal States, including States bordering enclosed or semi-enclosed
seas, whose geographical situation makes them dependent upon the exploitation
of the living resources of the exclusive economic zone of other States in the
subregion or region for adequate supplies of fish for the nutritional purposes of
their population or parts thereof and coastal States which can claim no exclusive
economic zone of their own.
94. Id.
95. Part XV of the Convention is devoted to Settlement of Disputes arising from inter-
pretations and applications of provisions of the UNCLOS Treaty. Specifically, Article 297(3)
applies to the resolution of disputes involving fisheries in the EEZ. The subsection reads:
3(a) Disputes concerning the interpretation or application of the provisions of
this Convention with regard to fisheries shall be settled in accordance with Sec-
tion 2, except that the coastal State shall not be obliged to accept the submission
to such settlement of any dispute relating to its sovereign rights with respect to
the living resources in the exclusive economic zone or their exercise, including its
discretionary powers for determining the allowable catch, its harvesting capacity,
the allocation of surpluses to other States and the terms and conditions estab-
lished in its conservation and management laws and regulations.
(b) Where no settlement has been reached by recourse to section 1 of this Part,
a dispute shall be submitted to conciliation under Annex V, section 2, at the
request of any party to the dispute, when it is alleged that:
(i) a coastal State has manifestly failed to comply with its obligations to
ensure through proper conservation and management measures that the
maintenance of the living resources in the exclusive economic zone is not
seriously endangered;
(ii) a coastal State has arbitrarily refused to determine, at the request of
another State, the allowable catch and its capacity to harvest living re-
sources with respect to stocks which that other State is interested in fish-
ing; or
(iii) a coastal State has arbitrarily refused to allocate to any State, under
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manage the fishing resources using a national instead of a federal
system of management, the effects of the Treaty's substantive as well
as enforcement provisions are clear. The United States, however, op-
erates under a federal system of management. What has not been
explored adequately is the potential effects, if any, on state manage-
ment authority and on state influence on federally managed interna-
tional fishery policies of the nation in the event the United States
ratifies the Treaty.
Coastal states have not always had a vehicle such as the FCMA
to influence foreign fishery policy. Domestic fishing interests take
precedence over decisions pertaining to the international fishery deci-
sions of the State Department." Through state participation in the
preparation of an FMP, the states can now directly influence the
level of foreign fishing through the calculation of the surplus of fish
available following domestic allocation. 97 Should the Secretary of
Commerce fail to adopt the FMP or alter the Regional Management
Council's decision, member states have a legally protected right to
challenge that decision in court.9 8
Two cases involving different aspects of the FMP process pro-
vide examples of how normal operation of the Act works. Both serve
as illustrations of how foreign fishery interests could affect the Act's
effectiveness. Louisiana v. Baldridge" involved a challenge by the
State of Louisiana to an FMP for shrimp adopted by the Gulf of
Mexico Regional Fishery Management Council. Shrimp represent
the most valuable domestic fishery, having made up an average of
twenty-three percent of the value of all fish landed in the United
States from 1964 through 1977.10 The Gulf of Mexico accounted
articles 62, 69 and 70 and under the terms and conditions established by
the coastal State consistent with this Convention, the whole or part of the
surplus it has declared to exist.
(c) In no case shall the conciliation commission substitute its discretion for that
of the coastal State.
(d) The report of the conciliation commission shall be communicated to the ap-
propriate international organizations.
(e) In negotiating agreements pursuant to article 69 and 70, States Parties, un-
less they otherwise agree, shall include a clause on measures which they shall
take in order to minimize the possibility of a disagreement concerning the inter-
pretation or application of the agreement, and on how they should proceed if a
disagreement nevertheless arises.
Id. at art. 297(3). Section 2 of Part XV is a compulsory dispute resolution mechanism. Section
I is a more general statement of objectives but includes conciliation (Art. 284) as an alterna-
tive means of resolution for fishery disputes when one of the nations has refused to submit to
the binding decision process.
96. See U.S. FOREIGN POLICY, supra note 45, at 62-65. The author there identifies the
various competing fishery interests in the United States. See also MacRae, supra note 79.
97. 16 U.S.C. § 1853(a)(4).
98. 16 U.S.C. § 1855(d).
99. 538 F. Supp. 625 (E.D. La. 1982).
100. Id. at 627.
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for eighty percent of the dockside value of these landings.""1 The
Shrimp FMP challenged by Louisiana contained a measure which
closed the FCZ adjacent to the Texas territorial seas to all but Texas
shrimpers in conjunction with the state's own closure of the territo-
rial waters under its exclusive control. 102
The purpose of the closure was to maximize the tonnage of
shrimp caught. 0 3 This measure was thought to be required because
the shrimpers in Texas and Louisiana have distinctly different fish-
ing strategies. Louisiana shrimpers in general support, and are a
product of, the Louisiana shrimp canner industry. 04 Canners use
small and medium sized shrimp. 10 5 Texas processors, and conse-
quently Texas shrimpers, seek medium and large shrimp. 06 Al-
lowing Texas boats to harvest shrimp before the shrimp have fully
matured results in large fishing mortality resulting from discarded
small shrimp. Louisiana objected to the closure provisions because its
canners needed a year round supply of small shrimp.10 7
The district court, speaking through Judge Robert F. Collins,
upheld the FMP.'08 The specifics of the opinion are less important
for an understanding of the Act's contribution to state management
than the result of the opinion. For one of the first times, one state's
management scheme was accepted by the federal management au-
thority for the FCZ over another state's. The FCMA's promise of
giving coastal states a say in national and other state's management
programs was fulfilled.
On the other hand, even with the FCMA in effect, the states
have been subject to the old deference to foreign fishing interests
because of State Department influence. In Maine v. Kreps,0 9 the
State of Maine complained about the adoption by the Secretary of
Commerce of a Preliminary Fishery Management Plan for herring
in the Georges Banks fishing grounds." 0 In the PFMP, the Secretary
set the OY for herring at 33,000 m.t. with the United States' share
being 12,000 m.t."' The United States' share was a 6,000 m.t. re-
duction from the original plan - a reduction made in return for
economic concessions from the Federal Republic of Germany" 2 and








108. Id. at 631.
109. 563 F.2d 1043 (Ist Cir. 1977).
110. Id. at 1045.
Ill. Id. at 1046.
112. Id.
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the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries (ICNAF) for a limited season for
foreign fishermen.118
Maine challenged the allocation of 12,000 m.t. as being too
low. " 4 The State argued that the domestic fleet's hold capacity and
renewed interest in the fishery should be used in determining the
domestic allocation.11 5 In rejecting the State's claims, the Court dis-
cussed the FCMA's relationship to foreign policy considerations and
the then prospective UNCLOS Treaty:
While the Act, in its preamble makes clear that it was enacted
in reaction to the ineffectiveness of international agreements to
prevent overfishing, § 1801(a), it speaks to encourage such inter-
national agreements in the future, and to encourage continued
active United States efforts to obtain an internationally accept-
able treaty at the upcoming Third United States Conference on
the Law of the Sea. " 6
In another appeal to the Court of Appeals in the same case, an
affidavit of the federal government stated explicitly that foreign af-
fairs played a role in the final determination of both OY and the
allocation. The affidavit concluded:
It is my opinion that any abrupt termination of foreign fishing,
given this historical background, could have significant adverse
impacts on our international fisheries relations. "'
While the Act thus has fulfilled its promises in relation to providing
a more effective mechanism for states to influence both foreign and
domestic fishing policies, Maine v. Kreps should present a red flag.
It has long been recognized that treaties, when properly ratified,
become part of the law of the land. 1 8 The fishery provisions of the
UNCLOS Treaty are arguably self-executing, even though the
FCMA directs the Secretary to pass regulations to ensure that regu-
lations promulgated under the FCMA are in compliance with the
Treaty." 9
113. Id.
114. Id. at 1048.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 1049.
117. State of Maine v. Kreps, 563 F.2d 1052, 1055 (1st Cir. 1977).
118. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
119. If it is found that the provisions are not self-executing, at least one well respected
scholar would find little substantive conflict between the UNCLOS Treaty (draft) and the
FCMA. Burke, U.S. Fishery Management and the New Law of the Sea Treaty 76 AM. J.
INT'L L. 24 (1982). Burke concludes: "That the draft LOS Treaty and the FCMA are, with
few exceptions, in fundamental accord is not surprising. Both reflect a strong effort to protect
coastal interests." Id. at 52. Burke does, however, suggest that coastal nations really have little
need to fear any loss of fishery management authority as a result of the Treaty. Id.at 53.
His conclusion on its face is true as far as the nations are concerned. From the states'
perspective, however, the new element of foreign involvement should be of greater concern
than it is to the federal Departments of State and Commerce. Burke's treatment of the alloca-
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A hypothetical example of how the Treaty could affect a coastal
state's fishery management authority will illustrate the potentially
negative effect of the Treaty on state management and control as it
currently exists under the FMCA:2 0 An FMP for shrimp determines
that domestic harvesting capacity will leave no surplus available to
foreign fishing interests in the area controlled by the Gulf Regional
Fisheries Management Council. Mexican shrimpers, through Mex-
ico, complain of the action, citing an improper calculation and a fail-
ure to manage properly. The United States would then have the op-
tion of refusing to submit the dispute to binding decision. 2' The
dispute would then go to conciliation.' 22 If, however, the case was
submitted under binding decision-making, the FMP would be subject
to scrutiny in a forum in which the coastal state would not have an
independent voice. One of the greatest values to the coastal states
under the FCMA is that its provisions ensure state input into foreign
fishery policy.' 23 The United States, presumably through the State
Department, would represent all national interests, including the in-
terests of the individual states, in the event of a Treaty dispute.
In its review of the foreign fishing component of an FMP, the
decision-makers' 2' can consider allegations that the coastal nation
against which the complaint is lodged has manifestly failed to con-
serve and manage its fishery resources. 2 ' Logically, foreign relations
take center stage in an international setting, 2 " and as noted above,
international relations often take precedence over domestic state pol-
icies. If the United States were to accept binding arbitration and if
the international body decides that an FMP either fails to manage or
conserve resources properly, the United States would then be
presented with a binding 27 determination necessitating a plan alter-
ation. Because most countries do not have a federal system of fishery
management, nations which are found to have failed in their obliga-
tions need only change national policies. In the United States, how-
ever, because management of fishing resources is a multi-jurisdic-
tion of authority between the states and the federal government overlooks this concern. Id. at
49-51.
120. Any number of examples could be used. All that is necessary for the potential
conflict to exist is an interest in the fishery by both foreign and domestic fisherman and a
range for the stock across the boundary of the EEZ and the state's territorial waters.
121. UNCLOS Treaty, supra note 2, at arts. 297(l)(c) and 3.
122. Id. at art. 297(3). Conciliation is governed by the rules set out in Annex 5. See also
supra note 95.
123. 16 U.S.C. 1853(a)(4).
124. UNCLOS Treaty, supra note 2, at art. 295(3)(b)(1).
125. Id.
126. It is understandable that the State Department would have its own agenda. What
is feared is the possibility that their concerns would predominate any solution.
127. Again as noted, the nation is not required to submit to binding decision making.
UNCLOS Treaty, supra note 2, at art. 297. However, there are mandatory submission re-
quirements in Annex V, Section 2 for fishery disputes. See supra note 95.
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tional endeavor, such a decision would necessitate a change in
national and state fishery policies.
Applying these fact to the Mexican example, the Mexican gov-
ernment might complain that a harvesting strategy, such as the one
Louisiana uses inside her territorial waters, results in a failure to
ensure proper maintenance of the living resources in the EEZ. To
comply with the Treaty, the United States, if found to have failed to
protect those resources, would be faced with a choice between exert-
ing pressure on Louisiana or preempting Louisiana's right to manage
its fisheries.
The Secretary of State, who is often at odds with domestic fish-
ing interests, would have a much greater justification for putting
pressure on the Secretary of Commerce to use the preemption au-
thority. Domestic state interests could easily be sacrificed to interna-
tional gain. The decision by the international tribunal and the inter-
est of the Secretary of State thus may require a coastal state to alter
one or more of its management decisions. Failure to do so may result
in preemption under the FCMA. 12 8
In order to preempt a state management scheme, the Secretary
of Commerce must find that the fishery to be preempted is covered
by an FMP and is engaged in managing fisheries predominantly
within the FCZ or beyond. 129 Further, the Secretary must find that
the management practice substantively and adversely affects the car-
rying out of the FMP. 130
Shrimp spawn in the territorial waters of the states. Juveniles
migrate shoreward and grow in the internal waters of the various
states. '3 Following the hatch, the juvenile shrimp leave the nursery
areas and continue moving offshore.' 32 In the Mexican example set
out above, the coastal state may be allowing the harvesting of juve-
nile shrimp to be used as canners. 33 Coupled with natural mortality,
the loss of the more mature and larger adults attributed to this type
of fishing might create a significant reduction in the number of ani-
mals available to the offshore fishermen who seek the medium to
large-size shrimp.
Obviously, the FMP for shrimp would have to take this factor
into account. As a result, MSY and possibly OY for the fishery
would be reduced. Dependent on the domestic vessel capacity to har-
128. 16 U.S.C. § 1856(b).
129. Id. This phraseology is awkward. It is submitted that it means that the majority of
fishing pressure is applied on the stock outside of the territorial waters of the state.
130. Id.
131. Internal waters are the waters landward of the line from which the breadth of the
territorial sea is measured.
132. COASTAL ECOSYSTEMS, supra note 73, at 26-27.
133. Louisiana v. Baldridge, 538 F. Supp. 625 (1982).
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vest OY, foreign allocations would clearly be seriously affected by
the type of state strategy adopted. Using only domestic criteria, such
a result is perfectly acceptable. However, a country such as Mexico
could also legitimately feel that the United States had failed to en-
sure that the resources in the FCZ were being adequately protected.
Other examples of possible preemption problems include any
migrating fishes which spend time in estuaries and migrate outside
beyond the state's territorial waters. In addition to the shrimp,
croaker, winter flounder and striped bass also migrate into the FCZ
from internal and territorial waters.' Other fish which may be sub-
ject to the scenario outlined above might include certain weakfish,
redfish, and black drum. " '
While the UNCLOS Treaty is directed at management and
conservation in the FCZ, it is hard to assume that a coastal nation
which has been found to have violated its responsibilities can effec-
tively correct the deficiency only in the FCZ. Fish do not read maps;
they must be managed as a unit inshore and offshore. Preemption,
failing persuasion, is the only tool available to the Secretary of Com-
merce to disrupt coastal state practices in instances where coastal
state policies result in an adverse decision under the UNCLOS
Treaty.
VI. Conclusion
The FCMA was adopted to insure that decisions relating to
management of the fisheries located in the FCZ be a joint federal
and state undertaking. Foreign fishing interests have been required
to submit to the resulting federal-state management decisions since
134. COASTAL ECOSYSTEMS, supra note 73, at 26.
135. Id. Although the UNCLOS Treaty, Article 77 defines lobsters as sendentary and
thus outside of the controls discussed above, the population pattern and reproductive cycle is
an excellent model. See L. STUBBS, THE AMERICAN LOBSTER - HOMARUS AMERICANUS
(1979); J. KROWSE, HISTORICAL REVIEW OF LOBSTER TAGGING STUDIES IN AMERICAN WA-
TERS (1898-1980) (June 1980); LOBSTER INFORMATION Leaflet No. 7. See COOPER & UZMAN,
MIGRATION AND GROWTH OF DEEP SEA LOBSTER HOMARUS AMERICANUS, 171 Science 288
(1971). An historic fishery has developed in Maine's inshore area. Several years ago, a fairly
substantial lobster fishery also developed offshore, out to about the 200 mile limit. Present
thought is that the lobsters making up the two fisheries are unrelated. However, based on a
number of studies, there is a developing body of evidence that suggests that the two popula-
tions are related through onshore-offshore migration.
Fishing pressure in the inshore fishery is immense. If in fact the populations are related,
common sense dictates a severe reduction in OY as well as in possible foreign fishing alloca-
tion. Clearly an argument could be made by a foreign fishing country that management mea-
sures to ensure the conservation of the species would require reduction in the fishing pressure
from the inshore fishery. In fact, should the populations truly be related, inshore strategies
might be detrimental. Hypothetically, if, as suspected, there is a migration of young from the
inshore area to the offshore area for spawning, the inshore strategy may be taking the spawn-
ers that supply both fisheries. Because it takes seven or more years for a lobster to reach sexual
maturity, a combination of natural and fishing mortality may combine to effectuate a dramatic
crash in the offshore fishery. Foreign interests could legitimately complain of United States
fishery strategy in the FCZ.
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1976. The UNCLOS Treaty may change this emphasis by giving
foreign interests a say in United States fishery policies. The result
would be a further erosion of state control over fisheries. This impact
should be carefully examined before the United States ratifies the
UNCLOS Treaty.
